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Abstract 
To highlight the safety-critical areas of hypersonic vehicles through data-driven analysis, this paper applies the 
hazardous factors of the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) method recommended in the advisory circular AC-
431.35-2A to review 99 mishap flights of hypersonic vehicles. Mishaps with complex processes are modeled and 
analyzed using a new graphic method for aviation accident analysis named accident tree (AcciTree). Unsafe factors 
identified are then examined statistically to highlight the safety-critical zones and to identify possible new hazardous 
factors for the PHA list. The results indicate that the first-level categories of the PHA list have been defined extensive 
enough by the method to cover all hazardous factors examined in the 99 mishaps; and six factors are newly identified 
as supplements to the second-level categories to address the hypersonic features. The top six hazardous factors are 
system malfunction, hazardous component, protective system, system compatibility, undesired state, and human error; 
and the six systems with top high occurrence frequencies are propulsion, heat protection, flight control, brake, 
environment control, and landing gear. 
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rF  relative occurrence frequency of a system factor 
ON   occurrence number of a system factor 
AN  applicable mishap number of a system factor 
1. Introduction 
Increasing activities in space transportation have led to efforts of authorities to regulate this area. The 
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has proposed to accommodate sub-orbital and orbital flights in 
the regulation [1]. And, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has established a regulation system to 
address safety aspects of commercial space transportation [2]. In the Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 
system, one important focus of certification is on system safety process of the proposed mission; and, the 
beginning of the system safety process lies in hazard identification [2-3]. 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is one of the methods recommended by the FAA in advisory 
circular AC-431.35-2A for hazard identification in system safety processes of reusable launch and reentry 
vehicles [3]. Different from the Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA) widely used in aviation industry [4], 
the PHA adopts a list of hazardous factors as guides and minimum considerations for identification of 
hazards from proposed missions [5]. However, within this scope, which factors are relatively more safety-
critical? How well could the factors cover the causes of existing mishaps? Answers to these questions may 
trace back to data-driven studies for the safety-critical zones of these vehicles. 
Based on the hazardous factors of PHA, 99 mishap flights of hypersonic vehicles are studied in this 
paper to highlight the safety-critical areas and identify possible new hazardous factors for the PHA list 
through data-driven analysis. 
2. Unsafe factors of the PHA 
In the PHA list, hazardous factors are divided into two levels. The first level provides general 
hazardous categories, and the second puts forward detailed sub-categories. The hazardous factors of PHA 
given in Ref. [5] are summarized as follows. 
(1) Hazardous components: energy sources, fuels, propellants, explosives, pressure system, etc. 
(2) Subsystem interfaces: signals, voltages, timing, human interaction, hardware, etc. 
(3) System compatibility constraints: material compatibility, electromagnetic interference, transient 
current, ionizing radiation, etc. 
(4) Environmental constraints: drop, shock, extreme temperature, noise and health hazards, fire, 
electrostatic discharge, lightning, X-ray, electromagnetic radiation, laser radiation, etc. 
(5) Undesired states: inadvertent activation, fire/explosive initiation and propagation, failure to safe, 
etc. 
(6) Malfunctions to the system, subsystems, or computing system. 
(7) Software errors: programming errors, programming omissions, logic errors, etc. 
(8) Operating, test, maintenance, and emergency procedures. 
(9) Human error: operator functions, tasks, requirements, etc. 
(10) Crash and survival safety: egress, rescue, salvage, etc. 
(11) Life-cycle support: demilitarization/disposal, explosive ordnance disposal, surveillance, handing, 
transportation, storage, etc. 
(12) Facilities, support equipment, and training. 
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(13) Safety equipment and safeguards: interlocks, system redundancy, fail-safe design, subsystem 
protection, fire suppression systems, personal protective equipment, warning labels, etc. 
(14) Protective clothing, equipment, or devices. 
(15) Training and certification pertaining to safe operation and maintenance of the system. 
(16) System phases: test, manufacture, operations, maintenance, transportation, storage, disposal, etc. 
3. Data sources and analysis methods 
3.1. Data sources 
Only mishaps of hypersonic vehicles which are severer than the critical level are included for this 
study, i.e., mishaps severer than “major property damage to the public, major safety-critical system 
damage or reduced capability, significant reduction in safety margins, or significant increase in crew 
workload”, as defined in AC-437.55-1 [6]. The mishap cases are from public reports, with a total of 99 
mishaps of 8 programs, including X-15 [7-8], DC-X(A) [9], Space Shuttle [10-12], X-37 [13-14], HyFly 
[15], X-43A [16-17], X-51A [18] and HTV-2 [19]. 
3.2. Analysis methods 
To the mishaps with direct and simple causes, the conclusions given in the reports are directly 
categorized according to the PHA list [5]. However, in some cases like the space shuttle Challenger 
disaster [11] and the X-15 reentry breakdown [7-8], the accident processes and causes are complex, 
involving adverse interactions among human, technology, and environment, as well as organizational 
deficiencies. These mishaps are analyzed using a new accident analysis approach named Accident Tree 
(AcciTree) [20] to identify latent hazardous factors from the investigation information as supplements to 
the official conclusions. 
AcciTree is an integrated graphic-taxonomic method which adopts a Y-shaped structure with a 
reaction-based concept for modeling the adverse human-aircraft-environment interactions of the accident 
direct process, and uses hierarchical levels for modeling the evolvement of the organizational deficiencies. 
To reduce the discrepancies of analysis due to entire subjectivity of the graphic method [21-25], further 
integration of the well-established Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) [26] into 
the graphic model establishes guides and minimum considerations for the graphic modeling, which 
enhances both reliability of the graphic analysis and logicality of the taxonomic analysis, thus improves 
the completeness of the results [20]. 
As a demonstration, the X-15 reentry breakdown accident [7-8] is analyzed by AcciTree method as 
follows. 
On November 15, 1967, an U.S. Air Force test pilot lost his life while flying the rocket-powered X-15 
research vehicle in a parabolic space flight profile. Investigation revealed that the primary cause was loss 
of mode awareness due to misinterpretation of a dual-use flight instrument – the confusion between yaw 
and roll indications led to inappropriate flight control input and subsequent loss of control of aircraft. 
Other contributive factors include system failures, pilot’s spatial disorientation, oculoagravic illusion due 
to high axial acceleration, and flawed ground monitoring system design [7-8]. AcciTree model of the X-
15 accident is shown in Fig. 1. 
As shown in Fig. 1, the three sectors of the Y-shaped accident direct model – human, aircraft, and 
environment – provides convenience for describing both the interactions and the boundaries between any 
two parts of the three sectors. Unsafe events within the Y-shaped structure are linked by reaction chains, 
and the whole accident direct process is described by a spiral reaction network converging at the accident. 
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The organization model adopts a cause-consequence mechanism and consists of three levels including 
unsafe supervisions, organizational influences of company, as well as regulatory failures and legislation 
deficiencies. 
Factors newly identified from the AcciTree analyses are also categorized according to the PHA list [5]. 
 
Fig. 1 AcciTree model of the X-15 reentry breakdown accident. First letters of the numbers of organizational factors -- “S”, “O” and 
“R” -- refer to the “Supervisory”, “Organizational” and “Regulation & Legislation” levels. 
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3.3. Statistical methods 
The top 6 categories of the statistic result are further analyzed using second-level sub-categories of the 
PHA list [5]. If factors identified above cannot be covered by the PHA list [5], appropriate new categories 
are developed and designated to these factors. 
The mishaps are also analyzed according to system types to highlight the safety-critical systems. 
Relative occurrence frequency of a system factor, rF , is defined as follows: 
O
r
A
N
F
N
                 (1) 
Where ON  is the occurrence number of a system factor; and AN  is the applicable mishap number of 
the factor. Applicable mishap of a factor is defined as a mishap that involves the factor. 
4. Results 
The results of the hazardous factors-based analysis are shown in Fig. 2 (a), and the results of the 
system-based study are given in Fig. 2 (b). The top 6 categories of the hazard-based analysis are further 
examined in Table 1, in which items in grey background are hazardous factors newly identified from the 
hypersonic mishaps. 
 
Fig. 2. (a) result of the hazardous factors-based analysis; (b) result of the system-based analysis 
Table 1. Sub-category distribution of the top 6 categories in hazardous factors-based analysis. Items in grey background are 
hazardous factors newly identified from the hypersonic mishaps 
Categories Sub-categories Ratios (%) 
System malfunction Mechanical 56.0 
 Electric-Mechanical 29.8 
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 Electronic 10.6 
 Electric 3.6 
Hazardous component Fuel 42.6 
 Propulsive system 40.7 
 Pressure system 16.7 
Protective system Heat protection 87.0 
 Environment control 13.0 
System compatibility Hazardous factors interference 45.4 
 Control algorithm 36.4 
 System principle 9.1 
 Electric interference 9.1 
Undesired state System anomaly 50.0 
 Exploration of new technology 40.0 
 Time delay 10.0 
Human error Skill-based error 42.8 
 Conceptual error 14.3 
 Adverse physiological state 14.3 
 Physical limitation 14.3 
 Adverse mental state 14.3 
The analysis indicates that all unsafe factors in the 99 mishaps examined are covered by the first-level 
categories of the PHA list [5]. However, the second-level sub-categories of the PHA list cannot cover all 
mishaps factors. For example, in the “system compatibility constraints” category, the incompatibility 
between flight control algorithm and flight dynamics characteristics of vehicle, as observed in the X-43A 
mishap [17], is not covered by the PHA sub-categories. The incompatibility of system principles between 
engine system and ground test system, as observed in the X-15 ground test explosion [7] is not covered 
by the sub-categories either. Therefore, it is necessary to identify new factors as supplements to the PHA 
sub-categories to address these hypersonic mishap factors. The factors newly identified include: 
x Heat protection for the protective system category. 
x Hazardous factors interference, control algorithm, and system principle for the system compatibility 
category. 
x Exploration of new technology and time delay for the undesired state category. 
Besides highlighting the safety-critical zones, some interesting findings are also revealed from the 
statistic results: 
x In the system malfunction category, the electronic and electric components, which are often considered 
more prone to failures, have far lower ratios than the mechanical components in the severer-than-
critical mishaps. This is probably due to the extensively-used redundant design for electronic and 
electric parts of modern aerospace system, which effectively decreases the possibility of single failure 
causing hazardous effects and makes the mechanical failures relatively prominent. 
x In view of protective system, the heat protection issue, which is observed in multiple mishaps 
including X-15 [7], Space Shuttle [10] and HTV-2 [19], and constitutes 87% of all protective system 
issues, is critical for flight safety of hypersonic vehicles. 
x While exploring one of the most cutting-edge areas of aerospace, the less-understood features of the 
hypersonic flight and the novel technologies adopted inevitably poses potential risks. One of the 
significant risks is the new flight dynamics characteristics emerging in the hypersonic flight, which 
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caused catastrophic mishaps of several recent vehicles, including the breakdown of X-43A in 2001 
caused by lateral-directional divergence due to model uncertainty [17], and the reentry divergence  and 
following self-destruction of HTV-2 in 2010 due to unknown aerodynamic characteristics of 
hypersonic phase [19]. Since flight control directly affects flight safety, it is necessary to pay special 
attentions to the new flight dynamics and control mechanisms possibly emerging in hypersonic phase 
to reduce the flight risk. 
5. Conclusions 
 (1) With a structure of two-level categories in PHA, the first-level categories have been defined 
extensive enough by the method, and can cover all hazardous factors examined in the 99 mishaps. While 
the second-level sub-categories show to be insufficient for hypersonic vehicles. Six more factors are 
identified from the mishaps, and hence taken as supplements to the second-level categories. 
(2) The six systems with top high occurrence frequencies in severer-than-critical mishaps are 
propulsion, heat protection, flight control, brake, environment control, and landing gear. The six 
categories of top hazardous factors are system malfunction, hazardous component, protective system, 
system compatibility, undesired state, and human error. 
(3) It is found that in the “exploration of new technology” sub-category, special attentions need to be 
paid to the new flight dynamics and control mechanisms possibly emerging in hypersonic phase to reduce 
flight risks. 
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